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TRUTH AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
William P. Marshall*
There is little agreement as to what values underlie the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.' The issue, nevertheless, is critical.
A jurisprudence that is not based upon an understanding of the val-
ues involved is likely to be perceived as shallow, inconsistent, and
nonpersuasive. Indeed, to the surprise of no one, such criticisms are
universally leveled at existing Religion Clause doctrine.2 More im-
portantly, as one commentator has noted, "[I]f we cannot articulate
a convincing justification for the commitment to religious freedom
then we cannot know its purpose, and we are accordingly paralyzed
in our efforts to interpret the commitment."
Interestingly, however, the question of what values underlie the
Constitution's commitment to religious liberty has, until recently,
escaped significant discussion. This lack of articulation may be a
result of the perception that there is a shared consensus as to the
reasons justifying religious liberty.' After all, the principle that reli-
gious liberty is an essential part of a free society seems so central to
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Craig Mousin, Steven Smith, Fred Gedicks, Chris Comer, Maureen
Collins, John Garvey, and Jim Lindgren for their helpful comments. Research assistance was
provided by Cynthia Sims and Douglas Desjardins.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2. Professor John Garvey, for example, has argued that one of the difficulties with Religion
Clause doctrine is that it has tended to rest upon values which have been seldom stated and/or
justified. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV.
779, 779 (1986); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
onciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 674-75 (1980) (arguing that the "Court's separate
tests for the Religion Clauses have provided virtually no guidance" and that the Court has not
adequately explained the conflict between the Clauses and such tests); Phillip E. Johnson, Con-
cepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 819 (1984)
("Many areas of constitutional law are unsettled, of course, but in most areas the uncertainty
concerns how far the Constitution requires us to go in a particular direction. In the Religion
Clause area, even the general direction is often difficult to ascertain."); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1992) [hereinafter McCon-
nell, Crossroads] (noting confusion in existing Religion Clause doctrine).
3. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 223 (1991).
4. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 779 (noting, however, that the rationales behind our commit-
ment to religious liberty were probably never as universal as they originally seemed).
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our nation's self-definition as to require no special justification.
As with most other things, however, an examination into suppos-
edly shared principles often yields a greater disparity than is ini-
tially anticipated. Such has been the case with the investigation into
the values underlying the Religion Clauses and recent scholarship
has witnessed a proliferation of theories as to the essential justifica-
tions for these Clauses. 5
This article will introduce a possible theoretical justification for
religious liberty into the values debate surrounding the Religion
Clauses. In a sense, the proposed introduction is actually a rein-
troduction, for the value that will be discussed is one that has long
been seen as an important justification for another clause of the
First Amendment - the Speech Clause. In this article, I shall ar-
gue that one of the essential values underlying the Religion Clauses
is the search for truth.
Part I will briefly review the literature which discusses potential
justifications for the Religion Clauses and discuss why these justifi-
cations are not fully satisfactory. It is not my intention to assess
whether any of the purported rationales are appropriate but rather
to show how, taken as a whole, they are incomplete. Part II will
present the affirmative case for the search for truth as an appropri-
ate justification and discuss some possible criticisms. Finally, Part
III will briefly suggest some of the implications that a search for
truth rationale may hold for Religion Clause doctrine.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The question of what values underlie the Religion Clauses has
spawned a number of different responses, and it is useful to briefly
survey the rationales that have been advanced.6
Pluralism. Both the free exercise and nonestablishment mandates
have been justified as instrumental in promoting religious plural-
5. See infra notes 6-48 and accompanying text (summarizing justifications for the Religion
Clauses).
6. A reason for the many responses may be due to the bifurcated nature of the Religion
Clauses themselves. The Religion Clauses have been consistently interpreted as involving two sep-
arate provisions - establishment and free exercise - and there is the suggestion, both in the text
and in the jurisprudence, that the two clauses are in some tension with each other and incorporate
separate values. The literature addressing the values underlying the Religion Clauses is therefore
itself somewhat divided, with some theories addressing only establishment, some only free exer-
cise, and some offering a unifying justification.
[Vol. 43:243
1994] TRUTH AND RELIGION
ism.7 The value of pluralism in turn has been posited as serving a
variety of interests. First, pluralism provides a set of mediating insti-
tutions that "act as a critical buffer between the individual and the
power of the state" 8 and serve to aid individuals in reaching a bal-
ance between protecting their individual interests and promoting the
public good. 9 In this manner pluralism works as a check on govern-
ment. 10 In the presence of a multiplicity of divergent groups with
constantly shifting alliances, the government will not be beholden to
any one prominent interest and is therefore less likely to threaten
any one group." Second, pluralism arguably promotes civic virtue.' 2
It imbues a sense of community obligation and virtue into the mind
of the citizen-believer that is necessary to maintain a system of self-
government.' 3 Third, pluralism reinforces a diversity within the
fabric of society that enriches the lives of all citizens.' 4
7. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1, 14-24 [hereinaf-
ter McConnell, Accommodation]; McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 168-69; Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 709-12 (1986) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Constitution].
8. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
9. Tushnet, Constitution, supra note 7, at 710.
10. ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 201 (1960); see also George W. Dent,
Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 875 (1988) (stating that socie-
tal subgroups serve as buffers against the expansion of government power).
11. Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76
GEO. L.J. 1691, 1699-1701 (1988) (discussing the crisscrossing of groups in a pluralistic society as
reaching a reasonably fair distribution of burdens and benefits).
12. The civic virtue rationale is arguably its own separate value. See generally Timothy L.
Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87 (1992)
[hereinafter Hall, Civic Virtue] (arguing for a civic republican interpretation of the Religion
Clauses).
13. SYDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA
53 (1963) (discussing the responsibility to follow the dictates of one's own mind but also recogniz-
ing the importance of organized religion because religious organizations, as voluntary organiza-
tions, encourage obedience and order and thus contribute to the public welfare); MARK TUSHNET,
RED. WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273-75 (1988) (arguing
that the Framers viewed religious groups as an opportunity for individuals to learn to act for the
common good); Hall, Civic Virtue, supra note 12, at 91 ("The republican argument for religious
freedom hinges on the persuasiveness of four premises: (1) that the virtue of citizens is important
to the health of the American political system; (2) that religion serves to inculcate citizen virtue;
(3) that religion either serves a distinctive role in the inculcation of virtue or otherwise is justified
distinctive constitutional protection; and (4) that a guarantee of religious free exercise serves to
enhance religion's virtue-inculcating role."); see also McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 7,
at 17-18 (arguing that the Framers hoped that religious observance would be followed by other
strong moral traits); Tushnet, Constitution, supra note 7, at 735-38 (arguing that even though the
focus has moved away from the republican tradition and civic virtue toward a liberal tradition
interested in the preservation of individual rights and private interests, the values underlying the
civic virtue argument are still important to constitutional discourse).
14. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-36 (1972) (holding that Amish children
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Equal Protection. The Religion Clauses have also been explained
as codifying a concern for the protection of minority rights similar
to that provided by the Equal Protection Clause. 15 It has been ar-
gued that religious minorities require special protections from
majoritarian discrimination and illegitimate government regulation
because of their relative political powerlessness and their histories of
persecution. 6 The establishment prohibition against the dominance
of one religious group,' 7 and the free exercise prohibition against
laws which single out religious practice or belief for adverse treat-
ment,' 8 potentially further this equal protection concern. 19
Lessening Divisiveness. Lessening divisiveness is another of the val-
ues advanced as underlying the Establishment Clause."° History and
current events have established all too well that political divisions
along religious lines can be particularly acrimonious and tumultu-
were exempt from compulsory school requirements). The Court's decision seemed in part to rest
upon the Court's deference and respect for the Amish culture.
15. See generally Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 89 (1990) (arguing that by interpreting the Religion Clauses in view of the equal protection
doctrine and the fundamental rights of autonomy and expression, the Religion Clauses will be-
come more intelligible); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning
Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217 (arguing that religious freedom and equal protection often over-
lap); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REV. 739 (1986) [hereinafter Lupu, Keeping the Faith] (comparing the Religion
Clauses's underlying principles to those of equal protection and free expression as a means of
avoiding a collision of establishment and free exercise). One recent article posits that the protec-
tion of minority rights was the driving force behind Justice William Brennan's otherwise seem-
ingly inconsistent ventures into the Religion Clause arena. See also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul
F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 517 (1991) (noting that Justice Bren-
nan's "approach to the religion provisions was driven by a vision of constitutionalism in which the
Bill of Rights was primarily a charter for judges to defend individuals and small or unpopular
minority groups against majoritarian infringement").
16. Brownstein, supra note 15, at 112. See also Lupu, Keeping the Faith, supra note 15, at
739.
17. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 568 (1991) [hereinafter Lupu, Reconstruct-
ing] (arguing that the prohibition against establishment laws is primarily to protect equal liberty).
18. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (hold-
ing that an ordinance which singles out a religious sect for adverse treatment violates the Free
Exercise Clause).
19. Equal protection concerns have also been advanced as providing a rationale justifying free
exercise exemptions from otherwise valid laws. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substan-
tive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Stephen
Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (both analyzing the
equalizing effect of the free exercise exemptions on minority and majority religions in allowing
exemptions to certain laws).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971) (discussing the potential divisiveness
that state funding programs to nonpublic schools may have on communities).
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ous. 2 1 Removing the government from religious issues and removing
religious issues from the government have been posited as necessary
to avoid conflicts between religious groups and between church and
state.22
Promoting Self-Identity. The protection of religious liberty
through the mandates of the Religion Clauses has also been justified
as critical to promoting self-identity. 23 According to this theory, reli-
gious affiliation reflects a fundamental bonding between the reli-
gious adherent and her religious beliefs and religious community. As
one commentator has written,
Religious beliefs . . . form a central part of a person's belief structure, his
inner self. They define a person's very being - his sense of who he is, why
he exists, and how he should relate to the world around him. A person's
religious beliefs cannot meaningfully be separated from the person himself;
they are who he is.24
Therefore, allowing the government to interfere with an adherent's
religious beliefs would be impermissible because it would attack the
individual's fundamental self.25
Protecting Conscience. Concern with the rights of conscience is
another justification offered for protecting religious liberty.26 The
21. See. e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947) (summarizing the European past
as follows: "Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protes-
tant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted
Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.");
see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1968) (stating that it is a "historical fact that govern-
mentally established religions and religious persecution go hand in hand").
22. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 S. CT. REV.
83, 95-98 (discussing the common use of the fear of social disunity and strife as a justification for
the Religion Clauses).
23. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause. 82 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1113, 1161-92 (1988) (arguing that separationism allows for the development of religious
self-identity); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 202 ("Religious belief and practice are important
to a person's sense of who she is and what kind of person she wants to be; the freedom to be
oneself entails the freedom to hold religious beliefs and to act in accordance with those beliefs.").
See generally Brownstein, supra note 15; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987) (both tying
religion to concerns of self-identity).
24. Conkle, supra note 23, at 1164-65.
25. Id. at 1173-75.
26. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984) (arguing that the purpose of
the Religion Clauses is to give both church and state breathing space and to protect the right of
conscience); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981)
[hereinafter Laycock, Autonomy] (arguing that the church has a protectable interest in autonomy
that does not create religious subsidizing and which allows for a personal conscience).
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liberal state, it is argued, may take no position on what is right and
good but, rather, must respect the moral and ethical principles of
the individual. 7 It is the individual's conscience and not the state
that serves as the "moral sovereign" over the individual.2 8 The indi-
vidual's conscience must therefore be protected from government in-
terference which can question or destroy the perceived integrity and
validity of the creed or faith to which a person adheres. 9
Reducing the Risk of Civil Disobedience. Another value offered
as underlying the constitutional commitment to religious liberty,
particularly through the creation of free exercise exemptions from
neutral laws, is the reduction of the risk of civil disobedience.30
When the laws of the state conflict with religious duties, the believer
must choose between obeying her government's laws or following
her religious obligations. 31 In the absence of an accommodation for
the religious belief, the believer may be forced to violate the govern-
ment's law for the sake of maintaining the integrity of her beliefs.3 2
Eliminating Special Suffering. Related to the civil disobedience
rationale is the value of eliminating special suffering. 3 A believer
27. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS. TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 140-41 (1986) (arguing that
the Religion Clauses protect an inalienable right to conscience and that there is a "negative lib-
erty" which acts to immunize one's ethics and rational decision-making powers from state coer-
cion or "spirituall [sic] Rape").
28. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 71 (1992) (examining conscience as a common moral denominator among different subcul-
tures in a pluralistic society).
29. Esbeck, supra note 26, at 358, 360.
30. Garvey, supra note 2, at 795-97 (arguing that religious views will sometimes conflict with
generally accepted norms and that without tolerance for their viewpoint, religious groups, such as
the Amish in Yoder, might be forced into civil disobedience in order to protect their religious
beliefs). This belief is similar to one held by John Locke. Although he initially advocated forced
religious unity, Locke eventually came to believe that religious intolerance actually fueled unrest:
"It is not the diversity of opinions ... but the refusal of toleration . . . that has produced all the
bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon account of religion." John Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 53 (Germany, Scientia Verlag
Aalen 1965) (2d ed. 1823).
31. Garvey, supra note 2, at 796 (equating the repression of religious behavior to the suppres-
sion of drink and arguing that free exercise exemptions act to minimize the harm in a "laissez-
fair" approach to religious freedom).
32. Id. at 797. The Amish in Yoder, for example, might move to another state or stay and fight
the Court's decision, which is obviously not the most desirable way to resolve social conflicts. Id.;
see also David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 COR-
NELL L. REv. 769, 882 (1991) (noting that Yoder provides strong precedent for accrediting equal-
ity to absolutist religions). The threat to the Amish community indicates "an inchoate recognition
of an [absolutist] claim." Id. at 886.
33. Garvey, supra note 2, at 792-94 (noting that this value seems compelling when viewed from
the perspective of the Amish in Yoder, who believed they would have faced "eternal damnation"
by complying with the law); see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in -the First Amend-
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who chooses not to disobey the civil law may experience special suf-
fering if forced to violate her religious principles. 34 A free exercise
exemption from a civil law alleviates the special suffering the adher-
ent might feel if forced to choose between her religious beliefs and
legal norms.3"
The Nonalienation of Citizens. A concern with the nonalienation
of citizens has also been suggested as a justification underlying the
Establishment Clause.36 This justification focuses on the supposed
harms suffered by those who perceive that the government has been
captured by opposing religious interests. 37 Unlike the civil disobedi-
ence or special suffering justifications, however, the nonalienation
rationale is concerned with an alienated or offended individual's po-
tential withdrawal from political participation. 8
Voluntarism. Still another proferred justification for the Religion
Clauses is religious voluntarism. Religious voluntarism asserts "that
both religion and society will be strengthened if spiritual and ideo-
logical claims seek recognition on the basis of their intrinsic
merit."3 9 Voluntarism presumes that the value in protecting reli-
gious liberty lies in the protection of the individual's right to choose
her belief rather than the individual's right to be bound by her be-
lief."' As the Court stated in Wallace v. Jaffree,4 ' "[Rieligious be-
ment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 597-601 (discussing the psychological toll a believer pays for
violating one of her religious principles).
34. Garvey, supra note 2, at 792.
35. See id. at 793 (recognizing the difficulty in proving that suffering from deprivation of reli-
gious liberty is special because of religious, as opposed to nonreligious, reasons). Regardless, Gar-
vey claims this value helps explain society's demand for free exercise. Id.
36. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that excessive entanglement sends a message to nonadherents that they are not full members of
the political community); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION 100-04 (1989) (arguing that the true harm of establishment and limiting free
exercise is having the government tell nonbelievers that they are not full members of the political
and social community); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-15, at 812-
990 (1978) (discussing the dangers of using religious means when secular means would accom-
plish the same purpose, including the danger of alienating nonbelievers); Neal R. Feigenson, Po-
litical Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Estab-
lishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 55 (1990) ("Government should strive not to
affect any person's political standing on the basis of her religious views.").
37. Feigenson, supra note 36, at 83-93.
38. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97, 625-27 (1989) (discussing
the government's use of religious symbols as relevant in determining whether the message sent to
nonadherents of a religion is that they are outsiders in the political community).
39. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 517 (1968).
40. Id. Specifically, Giannella notes that voluntarism is "an article of peace" against the "his-
toric evil" of religious involvement with politics. Thus, he argues, religious voluntarism assumes
19941
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liefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice
by the faithful . 4
The "Religious Justification." Finally, in a recent article, Profes-
sor Steven Smith suggested that there is a "religious justification"
which underlies the constitutional commitment to religious free-
dom.43 According to Smith, this religious justification has two com-
ponents. 44 The first, the priority claim, asserts the precedence of re-
ligious obligations over temporal concerns." The second, the
voluntariness claim, contends that "religious goods or duties by their
nature entail freedom of choice."'46 However, unlike the voluntarism
value just discussed, which is based on the value of freedom of
choice,47 this voluntariness claim is based upon the assertion that
compelled religion is impossible.48
Overview. As even a superficial perusal of this list indicates, the
values posited as justifications for the Religion Clauses are disparate
and wide-ranging. Nevertheless, there is consistency in at least one
respect. With the exception of voluntarism, all of the purported val-
ues present a similar conception of religion; religion is seen as semi-
nal, authoritative, and absolutist both in the mind of the individual
and in the definition of her religious community. 9 It is viewed as a
product of external obligation rather than as a product of individual
choice. For example, the pluralism and antidivisiveness rationales
depend upon the existence of religious communities of settled defini-
tion. It is only because a religious community has definable bounda-
that religion and society can become spiritually strong only by seeking religion independently and
freely. Id.
41. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
42. Id. at 53, quoted in Michael J. Sandel, Religious Liberty - Freedom of Conscience or
Freedom of Choice?, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 597, 608.
43. Smith, supra note 3, at 153-54.
44. Id. at 154.
45. Id.; see also infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the
priority claim).
46. Id.
47. Cf Sandel, supra note 42, at 598 (suggesting that "freedom of conscience offers a better
way of understanding religious liberty than does freedom of choice"). Sandel also notes that the
Court confuses "the pursuit of preferences with the exercise of duties" and that this leads to
incorrect results in some Religion Clause cases. Id. at 615.
48. Smith, supra note 3, at 154-55 (arguing that it would be futile to force one to conform to a
.religious practice because "compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy" and "'forced worship stinks
in God's nostrils' ") (quoting Roger Williams).
49. It has been argued that even voluntarism is consistent with this absolutist understanding.
See Williams & Williams, supra note 32, at 896-900 (arguing that voluntarism refers only to
freedom from governmental interference rather than the freedom of choice in selecting religious
beliefs).
[Vol. 43:243
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ries that - on the positive side - it is able to serve as a mediating
structure (in furtherance of the pluralism value), or - on the nega-
tive side - that it has sufficient identity and allegiance over its
members to allow it to become a politically divisive force.50
Similarly, the self-identity rationale emphasizes religion as a
deeply-rooted, authoritative, and fixed structure in the mind of the
believer." It is for this reason, after all, that religion is so central to
the believer's sense of self. Indeed, to reference a number of the
proffered values, it is only because her religious beliefs are fixed and
authoritative that: (1) the religious believer's conscience might be
compromised; (2) her risk of civil disobedience might be increased;
(3) her suffering might be made acute; or (4) her alienation might
be effectuated by offending governmental action.
To be fair, the preceding analysis suffers from some over-general-
ization. The value of pluralism, for example, does not totally depend
upon the existence of static religious communities. It acknowledges
that the religious believer may at times freely choose her religious
community rather than be bound to a particular community solely
on account of a religious obligation.5 2 The pluralism model also rec-
ognizes that religious communities may themselves be dynamic and
may change their specific ideology and doctrine. 3 Similarly, the
self-identity value does not wholly depend upon a bonding of the
believer to her religious belief. It acknowledges a positive value in
the promotion of self-identity through the individual's freedom to
choose her religious belief and religious identity.5
Nevertheless, there is no question that the literature discussing
50. Along the same lines, the argument that the Religion Clauses promote equal protection
makes sense only if there are definable communities that could possibly be singled out for adverse
treatment.
51. See Conkle, supra note 23, at 1164-65 ("A person's religious beliefs cannot meaningfully
be separated from the person himself; they are who he is.").
52. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 169 ("Diversity allows each religion to 'flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.' ") (quoting Zorach v. Clausen,
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). But see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1109, 1152 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism]
(arguing that religious liberty should be protected because of the obligation religion imposes on its
adherents).
53. See Laycock, Autonomy, supra note 26, at 1391 (stating that "[a] church is a complex and
dynamic organization" where believers' views gradually change).
54. Smith, supra note 3, at 202. See also Conkle, supra note 23, at 1167, 1177. Conkle argues
that this philosophy also works to maintain a religiously inclusive political community, since a
community relationship is reciprocal between individuals and their community. Thus, the damage
to the community from state intervention varies in direct proportion to the extent of the individ-
ual's injury inflicted by government action. Id.
1994]
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these justifications (again excepting voluntarism55) views religion
more as a source of obligation and authority than as a source of
freedom. Indeed, many of the writings explicitly contend that reli-
gion is entitled to special constitutional concern precisely because of
the purported authority that it holds over its adherents. 6
Of course, depicting religion as inveterate and absolutist does not
mean that it is unworthy of constitutional attention. To the con-
trary, many of the values previously discussed are persuasive in
demonstrating the need for both establishment and free exercise
protections. 7 But there are substantial difficulties in maintaining a
jurisprudence which primarily emphasizes this side of religion. First,
reliance on the absolutist side of religion makes it susceptible to the
criticism that it is undemocratic 58  or unduly authoritarian. 9  As
such, this view of religion plays into the argument that religion
should be properly excluded from the public debate.60
55. But see Williams & Williams, supra note 32, at 896-900 (arguing that voluntarism refers
only to freedom from governmental interference rather than the freedom of choice in selecting
religious beliefs).
56. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 282 (1989) [hereinafter Ingber, Needed Clarification] (arguing
that the essential difference between religion and ideology is that "adherents of a religion usually
believe its principles are authoritative and that the source of that authority transcends both indi-
vidual conscience and the state"); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 52, at 1151 (positing that
"the right to practice religion is jurisdictionally beyond the scope of civil authority"); Smith,
supra note 3, at 154 (explaining that for many, "religious duties take precedence over other du-
ties, including nonreligious legal or social duties").
57. While my previous writings argue that religious liberty does not merit special protection in
the form of a constitutionally-compelled exemption under the Free Exercise Clause for religious
beliefs, I do agree that the pluralism and self-identity values support protection for religious be-
liefs as well as comparable secular beliefs under the freedom of speech and association. I also
believe that the equal protection rationale supports a free exercise protection against laws which
intentionally discriminate against religion.
58. Lupu, Keeping the Faith, supra note 15, at 741-42; Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 17,
at 568; see also Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 184 (1990)
(noting that "the authoritarian and undemocratic nature of religion is inconsistent with the anti-
authoritarian and democratic biases of the Constitution").
59. Gey, supra note 58, at 184. This is the view of religion that John Milton spoke out against
more than three centuries ago. John Milton, Areopagitica, in 3 HARVARD CLASSICS 199 (Charles
W. Eliot ed., 1909).
60. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 244 (1973) (not-
ing that people are tempted to proclaim their individual beliefs to be universal truths); Louis M.
Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance
Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 (1987) (discussing the difficulties inher-
ent in making the public/private distinction). But see Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 674 (1992) (arguing that public life is hostile to reli-
gion and tracing that hostility to liberal political theory's impulse to divide society into distinct
public and private spheres). Compare MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELI-
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Moreover, in a broader sense, the absolutist conception highlights
those aspects of religion that have historically proved troublesome.
By emphasizing authority, intransigence, and allegiance to a partic-
ular doctrine, this conception of religion focuses on those aspects of
religion which have worked to divide humanity rather than those
that have brought it together.6 While there may be value in main-
taining a society with competing religious communities,62 as some
theorists have argued, there is, assuredly, also value in the realiza-
tion that there is a universal religious concern common to the
human condition.6"
Similarly, the absolutist model works to undercut principles of
tolerance. By protecting that aspect of religion which lays claim to
"Truth" or "Right," these theories promote the sort of religious fer-
vor that leads to intolerance.64 As has been noted, the logical con-
clusion of the belief that one has discovered truth is an attempt to
impose that truth on others.65 The quieting of the absolutist claim,
on the other hand, reinforces tolerance for competing ideas (even if
one does not accept them on their merits) because it suggests to the
believer that her own certainty is not something beyond question. 66
There is also a historical objection to the absolutist model. I do
GION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 106 (1991) (arguing that invitation to the public
debate should be extended to those religious traditions that are not absolutist and denied to those
that are) with Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954,
968-70 (1992) (attacking Perry's basic assumptions and advocating that it is possible for the irre-
ligious and the religious to agree entirely on what is essential to living a meaningful life without
addressing their metaphysical disagreements).
61. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1515 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
62. Id.
63. PERRY, supra note 60, at 106. Indeed, the recognition that a common human enterprise
underlies religion and that truth is something to be sought rather than something to be claimed
promotes the sort of politics discussed in Perry's LOVE AND POWER, in which he notes that when
religion enters into the public marketplace without a claim of absolute right, a healthy dialogue
can be achieved. Id.
64. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that a logical result of a deep conviction is intolerance); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMER-
GENCE OF A FREE PRESS 3, 5 (1985) [hereinafter LEVY. EMERGENCE] (discussing free press as an
offshoot of religious freedom since it was necessary for people to believe that "the truth of their
opinions, especially their religious opinions, was relative rather than absolute").
65. LEE C. BOLLINGER. THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 61-64 (1986) (arguing that believers may feel
motivated to impose their beliefs on others because of a fear that they will otherwise appear
uncertain about their beliefs); see also Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of
Christ: Why Freedom of "Belief' is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1992) (examining the
conflicts that have marked the relationship between church and state).
66. Cf. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 93-95
(1990) (arguing that the encouragement of dissent is healthy for democracy).
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not want to overstate the historical case, but it is at least interesting
to note that predicating the value of the Religion Clauses on an ab-
solutist conception of religion runs counter to at least one strain of
constitutional history. While the views of the Framers regarding re-
ligion were diverse, 7 those who were influenced by natural law or
Deism, such as Thomas Jefferson, found absolutist forms of religion
repugnant.68 To these thinkers, religion was not valuable because of
its affixation to dogma. 69 Instead, the natural law philosophers and
Deists encouraged people to move beyond the dogmatic preachings
of their chosen religion and to ask questions in pursuit of transcen-
dental truth." Merely accepting the teachings of any sect did not
accomplish this goal. 7 1 Thomas Jefferson's comment in this regard,
therefore, is especially revealing: "I have never allowed myself to
meditate a specific creed."72
Still another problem with the absolutist view is that it makes for
a troubled jurisprudence. Constitutional law is rights-based and pre-
mised on notions of individual freedom and choice.73 It is difficult, if
not impossible, to meaningfully integrate absolutist theories into a
67. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1559, 1586-91 (1989) (arguing that most of the Framers were not strict separatists but
rather believed that religion was necessary for providing virtue and morality and promoting good
citizenry); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 483 (discussing the Framers's diverse views re-
garding religion).
68. Deists believed that Scriptures and other religious writings were dangerous to the pursuit of
truth because people were encouraged to accept hearsay as revelation rather than to question the
religious writings and work toward the discovery of truth. Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason,
reprinted in DEISM: AN ANTHOLOGY 164, 173-76 (Peter Gay ed., 1968). But see Williams &
Williams, supra note 32, at 852-81. Professors Susan and David Williams argue that although
Madison and Jefferson adopted a volitionalist religious scheme and defended religious liberty on
freedom of choice principles, volitionalism was not always in the forefront of the beliefs held by
the Framers. Id. Calvinism, the orthodox theology that enforced the concept that human choice
has no religious effect, influenced a substantial portion of American culture a century and a half
before the Framers drafted the bill and during the ratification of the Constitution. Id.
69. See JOHN B. BURY, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 119 (1952) (stating that Deist
thought maintained utilitarian support for Christianity). Although natural law theorists and De-
ists did believe religion possessed societal value (the Reverend Conyers Middleton, regarded as
one of the most scholarly Deists, found tradition and establishment to be a virtue of Christianity),
they voiced some very strong objections to religion as well. Id.
70. Paine, supra note 68, at 173-76.
71. See also Williams & Williams, supra note 32, at 855 (noting that Jefferson believed that
even before entering a social contract, a person's duty was built on foundations of "freely
choos[ing] to live up to the divine obligations perceived by reason").
72. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Robert Whittemore (June 5, 1822), reprinted in 7
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 245 (New York, J.C. Riker 1855).
73. Williams & Williams, supra note 32, at 777-85 (discussing how volitionalism is an indis-
pensable assumption of our legal system). Exceptions to this general rule further support freedom
of choice in law, such as agency law, contract law, criminal law, and due process claims. Id.
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liberal constitutional model.74
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, viewing religion only as
inveterate and absolutist is incomplete. It omits another aspect of
religion - the focus of religion on the individual's search for beliefs
rather than the believer's adherence to set groups or principles.7
Religion may be searching, self-challenging, and not rigidly tied to
prefixed dogma or mores. 6 In this type of religious belief, religious
meaning does not stem from adherence to one set of beliefs or mo-
res; rather it stems from the search for religious meaning and inves-
tigation into the seminal questions of "What is meaning?" and
"What is truth?" It is to this value of religion that we now turn.
II. THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. The Search for Truth as a Justification for the Religion
Clauses
Although it has long been associated with freedom of speech, 77
74. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Reli-
gion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579 (1987) (discussing the conflict be-
tween absolutism and freedom); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 359 (1990) [hereinafter
Marshall, Compelled Exemption] (stating that since religion is often absolutist, it does not fit
neatly into a regular "individual-rights-oriented" constitutional analysis).
75. Foley, supra note 60, at 973-76 (stressing the importance of keeping moral commitments
separate and distinct from metaphysical beliefs in order to allow one to discuss freely and examine
certain principles or political issues without infringing upon the source of their moral commit-
ments). Foley provides a hypothetical dialogue on abortion between a Tillichian and a Camusian
to prove the point that even on the most controversial issues, it is possible for the religious Til-
lichian to engage in moral, political discourse without having to reveal the "religious roots of
[her] moral positions." Id. at 973.
76. Id. (positing that an individual might change his mind and choose to reject a religious faith
without changing any of his other moral or political beliefs).
77. E.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). Emerson
discusses four basic premises of the freedom of expression: (I) That freedom is a means of assur-
ing the self-fulfillment of individuals; (2) that it allows for the furthering of knowledge and the
discovery of truth; (3) that it assures all members of society can participate in the political pro-
cess; and (4) that freedom helps to maintain a society that is adaptable and able to compromise.
Id.; see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 966 (1978) (arguing that the First Amendment only restricts certain governmental actions
regarding an individual's conduct); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 119, 130-31 (1989) (examining the discovery of truth rationale supporting freedom of
speech). Not all commentators agree that the search for truth is properly considered to be a First
Amendment justification. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas, a Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-9 [hereinafter Ingber, Marketplace] (criticizing the theory that the market-
place of ideas promotes truth); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 591-93 (1982) (explaining that the First Amendment serves the purpose of allowing "individ-
ual self-realization").
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the search for truth has not been thought of as a value underlying
freedom of religion.7 8 The claim that the truth justification applies
to both freedoms, however, has substantial support. After all, the
constitutional commitment to freedom of religion is contained along-
side the commitment to freedom of speech in a single amendment. 9
Moreover, freedom of religion and freedom of speech have similar
goals and purposes" and share a common history.81
Equally significant is why "truth" is considered to be exclusively
of Speech Clause concern. According to seminal case law interpret-
ing the Speech Clause, freedom of expression promotes truth by fos-
tering a "marketplace of ideas" which enables truth to ultimately
prevail over falsity.82 The source of this theory is traditionally
thought to be a famous passage from John Milton's work Areopagit-
ica:88 "Let [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put
to the worse, in a free and open encounter. '84 The source of the
truth rationale in First Amendment doctrine in turn may be found
in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's classic dissent in Abrams v.
78. The possible exception to this notion is the voluntarism principle noted above. See supra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntarism principle).
79. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80. RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 165; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164
(1944) ("(T]he great liberties ensured by the First Article [sic] ...have unity in the charter's
prime place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings."); J. Morris Clark,
Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 336 (1969) (noting that in the
past, the Supreme Court has linked religious freedom and free speech); Roger Finke, Religious
Deregulation: Origins and Consequences, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 609, 614-15 (noting that separat-
ing the church from the state necessarily includes issues of individual freedom of rights like the
freedom of speech).
81. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 64, at 5. There is also a significant overlap between the two
freedoms, even in the development of First Amendment doctrine. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 713-15 (1977) (stating that the freedom of religion, rather than the freedom of speech,
justified the Court's holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring the state motto to be dis-
played on all license plates); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (requiring the
interests of religious freedom and free speech be balanced); see also William P. Marshall, Solving
the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 561-65 (1983)
(discussing Supreme Court cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses, in which the Court empha-
sized freedom of speech rather than religious freedom).
82. See. e.g., Ingber, Marketplace, supra note 77, at 2-8 (tracing the history of the market-
place justification for free speech to John Stuart Mill and John Milton and discussing generally
the marketplace idea that truth will prevail if ideas are allowed to be voiced).
83. Richard M. Thomas, Milton and Mass Culture: Toward a Postmodernist Theory of Toler-
ance, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 531-32 n.19-20 (1991).
84. Milton, supra note 59, at 239.
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United States:85 "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
. . "8 Given their critical importance to free speech theory, it is
interesting to compare these passages to those of Thomas Jefferson
in his work A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.87 Jefferson
wrote:
[T]ruth is great and will prevail, if left to herself; that she is the proper and
sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, un-
less by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument
and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to
contradict them .... 88
This passage is strikingly similar to the words written by Milton
and Holmes concerning the freedom of speech. The confluence of
freedom of religion and freedom of speech, however, does not end
with rhetorical similarities in these seminal tracts. What is often
forgotten, for example, is that Milton's Areopagitica, while present-
ing free speech themes, was essentially offered as a defense for reli-
gious freedom.8 9
In fact, the movement for speech and press freedom in English
history was deeply intertwined with, if not a derivative of, the move-
ment for religious liberty. Indeed, this relationship should not be
surprising.9" First, the primary censor in England was traditionally
85. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
86. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd & Lyman H. Butterfield eds., 1950).
88. Id. at 546. For an argument that the analogy between Jefferson's Bill and the marketplace
metaphor is inapt, see Jonathan K. Van Patten, In the End is the Beginning. An Inquiry Into the
Meaning of the Religion Clauses, 27 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1, 49 (1983).
89. Milton, supra note 59, at 185. Milton wrote Areopagitica in response to the Order of the
Long Parliament for the Regulating of Printing, which was an order of licensing passed by the
Presbyterian majority in the Long Parliament on June 14, 1643 to suppress the religious and
political views of their opponents. Id.
90. See LEVY. EMERGENCE, supra note 64, at 3 (arguing that freedom of expression evolved
from freedom of religion); HOWARD SHAW, THE LEVELLERS 39-44 (1968) (analyzing the Level-
lers, who strongly advocated religious freedom in the midst of their attack against press censorship
in the early 1600s). But while religious toleration was a foremost demand during this period, it
was joined by other social grievances, largely the freedom of speech. Id. at 46; see also HENRY N.
BRAILSFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1-17 (Christopher Hill ed., 1961)
(discussing the major platforms of the English Puritans, the primary of which was liberty of con-
science and religious toleration). Milton used several Leveller arguments as he fought for religious
toleration, the right of free discussion, and the liberty of printing. CHRISTOPHER HILL, MILTON
AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 102 (1979) [hereinafter HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLUTION];
see also CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 22-25 (1965)
[hereinafter HILL. ENGLISH REVOLUTION] (noting the Reformation's contribution to scientific
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the Church, not the State.9 1 The focus of any attack on censorship
was therefore necessarily directed at the Church. 92 Second, most
writings involved religious issues, and the Church commonly en-
gaged in censorship to quell the publication of ideas that it believed
harmful to its authority and doctrine.9 Those attacking the
Church's censorship power, therefore, did so based on their religious
convictions and with the goal of disseminating their own religious
ideas.94
Significantly, the search for truth rationale figured heavily in the
thinking).
91. Why the Church had this power is not esoteric, The power in part stemmed from the
Church's perceived (and self-declared) relationship to "Divine Truth." As the earthly representa-
tive of God, only the Church "knew" what was right and what was wrong; only the Church could
determine what was gospel and what was heresy. See also HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLUTION.
supra note 90, at 83 (noting that the Church used censorship to silence Protestant criticism);
MILTON R. KONVITZ. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 8 (1966) (discussing how the Catho-
lic church was the intermediary between man and God); LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 64, at 6
(noting how the Crown claimed authority of control as a right of prerogative when the invention
of the printing press magnified the probability of dangerous utterances against the Church). Par-
liament's powers increased during the mid 1600s and heretics' books were burned. HILL. MILTON
AND THE REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 201. See also, HILL, ENGLISH REVOLUTION, supra note
90, at 5, 27 (noting that the Church controlled English thought, conduct, and discussion).
92. HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 102 (noting that both Milton and
William Sedgwick were the leading progenitors of the rights of assembly and free discussion); see
also HILL, ENGLISH REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 95 (discussing the effects of religious censor-
ship); LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY
155-57 (1981) [hereinafter LEVY, HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY] (noting that religious and political
crimes were often connected). This is not to say that the state did not have a role in curbing
speech. Political dissent, for example, was countered primarily through breach of the peace con-
victions rather than censorship. The state feared that freedom of religious and political expression
would trigger events that would destroy the power of both the church and state. LEVY, EMER-
GENCE. supra note 64, at 5.
93. John Milton spoke to both these justifications in his work Areopagitica. He felt that those
individuals who seek to silence new religious ideas are actually the cause of disunity; their igno-
rance and fear keep them from permitting "others to unite those dissevered pieces which are yet
wanting to the body of Truth." Milton, supra note 59, at 233. Milton believed this was counter to
the "golden rule" of theology: "To be still searching what we know not, by what we know, still
closing up truth to truth as we find it ... ." Id. He disapproved of the "forced and outward
union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly divided minds." Id.; see also LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra
note 64, at 5-6 (explaining that the church and the state believed religious freedom could trigger
dangerous events); FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS 42 (1952) (noting that man's relationship to God
was the most absorbing topic of public discussion in the early sixteenth century); William Lamont,
Pamphleteering, the Protestant Consensus and the English Revolution, in FREEDOM AND THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 72-92 (R.C. Richardson & G.M.
Ridden eds., 1986) (discussing the role of English pamphleteering during the early 1600s in estab-
lishing the fight for religious liberty).
94. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 64, at 7 (noting that blasphemous libel or defamation of
religion charges made freedom of religious expression a grave risk).
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attack on censorship.9 5 Two separate truth-related arguments were
advanced. The first argued that vesting the exclusive power to con-
trol the discussion of Truth in one body (the Church) was poten-
tially antagonistic to the realization of Truth because it unreasona-
bly assumed that the Church was infallible. 96 The second argument
focused on the right of the individual to pursue truth on her own
accord.97 Church censorship was seen as interfering with this ina-
lienable and God-given right.9 8
Both arguments were recognized by the Framers.99 They were ar-
ticulated, for example, in Thomas Jefferson's seminal text on reli-
gious liberty, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.10 This
work attacked the state's power to proclaim "true" belief on the
grounds that state-supported beliefs led to the maintenance of "false
religions." '' Jefferson's Bill also criticized state restraint on non-
conforming beliefs as a "departure" from the plan of the Almighty
95. See JOSEPH FRANK, THE LEVELLERS 32 (1955) (noting that William Walwyn's radical
role in the Leveller movement for religious liberty was based on the concept of "one who searches'
for useful truth"); HILL. ENGLISH REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 95 (noting that Milton referred
to censorship in post-Elizabethan England as "this impertinent yoke of prelaty, under whose in-
quisitorious and tyrannical duncery no free and splendid wit can flourish"); HILL, MILTON AND
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 242-52 (noting that Milton felt that "[e]ach reader must
interpret the Scripture for himself"); DON M. WOLFE, LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PURITAN
REVOLUTION 324 (1944) (noting that the English Leveller "wordmasters" advocated an "open
battleground for the clashing of truth and error," thus objecting to the very concept of censorship
which shuts men's mouths "whilst they are robd of their liberties"); Christopher Marlowe, The
Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus, in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
ENGLISH LITERATURE 814, 837-42 (M.H. Abrams ed., 5th ed. 1986) (using the character of Dr.
Faustus to attack cardinals and bishops for censoring books).
96. LEVY, HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY, supra note 92, at 5. See HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLU-
TION. supra note 90, at 108 (noting that Milton insisted that men divorce themselves from the
custom of accepted ideas); Milton, supra note 59, at 233 (discussing the golden rule of theology).
Similarly, Walwyn felt no one was more qualified to minister church ways than individuals seek-
ing truth. HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 112.
97. Milton recognized both of these arguments. He believed that rather than lament the
search for new truths in religion, the Church should praise such searching, especially since the
Church itself had been so lax in moving forward to seek truth. Milton, supra note 59, at 235.
Milton believed that individuals could best judge for themselves what was good and what was evil.
In fact, he noted that people might be able to gain knowledge from and be forewarned by "evil"
things they read, thereby giving even potentially untruthful works a positive value. Id. at 211; see
also, HILL, MILTON AND THE REVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 250 (noting that Milton believed
that "the Bible tells us, clearly and simply, the truths essential to salvation"); Finke, supra note
80, at 609-15 (noting how it came to be recognized that religion was an individual decision and
how church control lacked the "vitality necessary to appeal to the people").
98. Milton, supra note 59, at 235.
99. E.g., LEVY. EMERGENCE, supra note 64, at 3.
100. Jefferson, supra note 87, at 545.
101. Id. at 547.
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that the individual should be free to pursue religious truth on her
own accord.'02 Indeed, with Jefferson's Bill as a backdrop, it is not
difficult to detect a reflection of both truth arguments in the text of
the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause's prohibition pro-
tects against government declarations of false truths, while the Free
Exercise Clause (as well as the Speech Clause) allows the individual
to search for Truth without state interference.
But there is an even more fundamental argument than history or
text which supports why truth is properly thought of as a value un-
derlying the Religion Clauses. Religion is more than a form of com-
munity bonding or an element of self-definition. At its center, it asks
if there is a spiritual reality which defines human existence and if
there are metaphysical principles which provide insight into what is
meaning, what is purpose, and what is good. Indeed, the question of
God is very much a question of metaphysical truth. Structuring a
Religion Clause jurisprudence without concern for these most fun-
damental religious inquiries seems at best shallow and non-
persuasive.
B. Criticisms of the Truth Justification
Despite the arguments in its favor, recognizing the search for
truth as a justification for the Religion Clauses is not without its
difficulties. There are at least two significant objections that can be
raised against the theory. The first is that the search for truth ra-
tionale does not "uniquely" apply to religion and therefore cannot
serve as an appropriate Religion Clause justification. The second is
that the search for truth rationale improperly implants its own "reli-
gious" orthodoxy into Religion Clause jurisprudence.' As we shall
102. Id. at 545. Jefferson wrote:
That Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that
free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint; that all at-
tempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacita-
tions, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from
the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet
chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do,
but to extend it by its influence on reason alone . ...
Id. (emphasis was removed from the bill when it was passed in 1786).
103. A third objection that might be raised is the postmodern contention that truth is not a
meaningful concept and, therefore, useless as a First Amendment goal. The reasons why truth is
not valuable from a postmodern point of view, however, do not apply to a search for truth ration-
ale. The essential point of the postmodern criticism is that truth is not objective and therefore not
universally accessible. The postmodern criticism, however, does not and cannot deny the possibil-
ity that truth exists. It therefore cannot reject the importance of a rationale which places constitu-
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see, the first of these objections ultimately serves to support the
search for truth contention. The second, however, cannot be entirely
overcome.
1. The Search for Truth Rationale is Not "Uniquely" Religious
In a recent article, Professor Steven Smith criticized the existing
literature on Religion Clause values because they relied on factors
that were not "uniquely" religious." 4 Presumably, because it also is
not uniquely religious, Smith would similarly reject a search for
truth rationale as an underlying Religion Clause justification. While
there is merit in Smith's contention that the existing literature is
deficient because it does not address what is essential in the protec-
tion of religious freedom, he is incorrect in his conclusion that the
failure to reference something that is uniquely religious means that
Religion Clause jurisprudence is fundamentally flawed.'0 5 After all,
important rationales have been offered in defense of the Free Speech
Clause which do not argue that there is inherent worth in speech
itself.'0 6 Indeed, the notion that various matters are entitled to con-
stitutional protection is often based on consequentialist theories that
consider the effects of, rather than the value inherent in, that which
is protected. 0 7
Moreover, the "religious justification" upon which Smith relies10 8
raises its own constitutional difficulties precisely because it is
"uniquely" religious. This is particularly apparent with respect to
tional value in the search rather than the attainment of truth. Moreover, particularly (but not
exclusively) in the religion context, the importance of truth does not and never has depended upon
universal accessibility.
104. See generally Smith, supra note 3, at 167-68 (explaining that the reason for the exclusion
of a religious justification may be the result of either implausibility or inadmissibility).
105. Smith's conclusion, however, is consistent with the goals that he posits for Religion Clause
jurisprudence. Smith's position is that the First Amendment singles out religion for a special con-
stitutional deference. If this is so, then he is correct - a uniquely religious value would be neces-
sary to justify special treatment for religion. On the other hand, there are substantial constitu-
tional difficulties inherent in presuming that religion is entitled to a special deference. See
Marshall, Compelled Exemption, supra note 74, at 357-59; William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 319-23 (1991) (both noting
problems with preferring religious over nonreligious claims). The search for truth rationale thus
accomplishes the dual purpose of recognizing what is essentially valuable in religion without creat-
ing a special preference for religion.
106. See Greenawalt, supra note 77, at 127-29 (discussing consequentialist theories of free
speech).
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing the two components that com-
prise the religious justification underlying the constitutional commitment to religious freedom).
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the component of Smith's "religious justification," which asserts
that the Religion Clauses reflect a priority of religious obligations
over temporal concerns.'0 9 First, this assertion suggests that the
Constitution is not neutral with respect to competing beliefs but, to
the contrary, that it endorses one particular belief system - The-
ism. This conclusion violates the seminal speech principle that there
is an equality in the realm of ideas." 0
Second, the priority claim adds a theological gloss to constitu-
tional interpretation that is in itself problematic."' The recognition
of a theological principle underlying the First Amendment would
require Religion Clause cases to be interpreted according to the the-
ological principle which the First Amendment presumably reflects.
This would leave the courts in the business of issuing theological
responses to such questions as: "What is a religious duty?" and
"Does the religious obligation at issue in this case conflict with a
secular obligation?" One problem with this sort of analysis, of
course, is that it requires the courts to engage in a task for which
they have shown a reluctance and an inability to succeed; that is,
the evaluation of the religious legitimacy of religious claims." 2
More importantly, the theological task at hand is not a relatively
minor one that may arise incidentally to a free exercise challenge," 8
establishment claim,"" or church property dispute." 5 Rather, it is
one that asks the courts to adopt an over-arching theological
approach.
109. See supra note 45, 108-15 and accompanying text (noting that the priority claim is one of
the two components of the religious justification).
110. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 20, 20-21 (1975).
111. See John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philoso-
phy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847 (1984) (arguing that proper interpretation of the
Religion Clauses requires the courts to expound a constitutional philosophy of human nature).
112. For instance, the Court stated:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposter-
ous, to most people. But if these doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs
of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
113. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (raising the question of whether a refusal
to work in an armaments factory is based upon a religious or moral objection).
114. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (raising the question of whether tran-
scendental meditation is or is not a religion).
115. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (upholding a state's right to apply neutral princi-
ples of law to resolve church property disputes).
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Even more troublesome, however, is the fact that evaluation of
Religion Clause claims on theological grounds may offend the prin-
ciple of sect neutrality which is itself a central concern of the Reli-
gion Clauses."1 ' Whose theological perspective should the courts use
to decide the issue - the perspective of the religious claimant, the
perspective of a constitutional theology yet to be explicated, or the
perspective of prevailing religious norms? As Professor Smith him-
self has recognized in another context, any inquiry into whose philo-
sophical or religious perspective should govern the adjudication of
constitutional norms can become highly troublesome.11 7
A search for truth rationale, on the other hand, does not raise any
of these concerns. Because it is not necessarily tied to a particular
theological understanding, the search for truth rationale neither cre-
ates a hierarchy of beliefs nor requires an injection of theological
understanding into constitutional interpretation.
At the same time, while the search' for truth is not uniquely reli-
gious, it does reflect an essential religious concern. It is a concern,
moreover, that was important to the Framers of the Constitution; in
this respect, it may be of significance that the Framers were likely
well aware that the search for truth was not a uniquely religious
enterprise. By the late eighteenth century, the meaning of transcen-
dent "Truth" was not tied only to religious thought and Theism, 8
but had acquired a secular dimension as well." 9 Enlightenment
116. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a Minnesota tax
law which had the effect of preferring one religion over another).
117. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutral-
ity and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 282 (1987). In his article, Smith
contends that the "no endorsement" test should be rejected because of ambiguity as to whose
perspective should govern the test's central inquiry: Whether or not the challenged governmental
action constitutes an endorsement of religion. There is, of course, no question that the "no en-
dorsement" test does pose interpretive difficulties. See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When
We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL L. REv. 495, 533-37 (1986)
(examining the difficulties of the symbolic approach). At least, however, the test does not require
the adoption and interpretation of a theological perspective from which to decide the issue.
118. Ingber, Needed Clarification, supra note 56, at 278-80. See generally Stanford Kessler,
Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom," 25 J. CHURCH & ST.
231 (1983) (asserting that Jefferson's beliefs regarding church-state relations were drawn from
Lockean philosophical notions that legitimate government is ordained by the people, not God, and
that true religious belief results from the free exchange of ideas).
119. See, e.g., BURY, supra note 69, at 105-06. Bury discusses Locke's concept that while
Christian revelation could not provide knowledge with certainty, reason could provide such knowl-
edge. Id. He also notes Locke's view that because Christian revelation could not provide such
knowledge, faith was subordinate to reason, thus mandating that a religious tenet had to be re-
jected if it was contrary to what reason demonstrated. Id.
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thinkers posited that Truth could be discovered by human reason. 120
The universe was seen to be orderly; it was governed by principles of
natural law that were discernable and accessible to the human
mind.121 To some, this natural law was inextricably bound with the
existence of God. 22 Indeed, the belief that natural law derived from
a Divine source was the governing postulate of Deism, the predomi-
nant religious belief at the time.123
However, the belief in natural law also served to divorce Truth
from its dependence on Theistic belief. Belief in natural law does
not require belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, a matter
which was clearly understood by those living in the late eighteenth
century.12 4 As the historian Carl Becker has written:
[Elveryone, the readers as well as the writers of books, was concerned to
know whether there was a God to care for his immortal soul, or no God and
no immortal soul to care for. It was in this guise that the dilemma ...
appeared to the common run of men: Were they living in a world ruled by a
beneficent mind, or in a world ruled by an indifferent force? 25
The implication of Enlightenment theory, in short, was that the
search for Truth involved, or could involve, matters of secular as
well as religious belief.12 6
There may also be another implication. If both religious and secu-
lar thought were concerned with the same subject, then freedom of
religion and freedom of speech were, in effect, complementary. I
cannot claim historical accuracy, but concern for the search for
truth may explain why the constitutional provisions protecting free-
dom of speech and freedom of religion are contained in one
amendment.
120. See Kessler, supra note 118 (discussing Locke's influence on the works of Jefferson).
121. See DEISM, supra note 68, at 13 (stating that the Deists were optimists who believed in the
power of human reason and felt that scientific inquiry could be used to solve the mysteries of the
world).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing how transcendent "Truth" had
acquired a secular dimension by the eighteenth century).
125. CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 74
(1932).
126. RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 126-27 (arguing that Jefferson explicitly recognized this
point); see also Kessler, supra note 118 (examining Locke's influence on the works of Jefferson).
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2. The Search For Truth Rationale Improperly Creates its Own
Religious Orthodoxy
The second objection to the search for truth rationale is less easily
avoided. This objection is that the search for truth value places con-
stitutional significance on only one form of religious tradition and
thereby improperly elevates that form of religion over all others as a
constitutional principle. At least part of this criticism is descrip-
tively accurate - the concern with the search for truth is not com-
mon to all religions. 27 Some religions, for example, do not place any
religious value on the search for truth because truth for them is
something which has been revealed. 12 8 Indeed, the position that
truth should be pursued by individual choice is directly antithetical
to the beliefs of these religions.'29 For other religions truth may not
be a meaningful concept, and to them the search for truth might be
seen as something that is largely irrelevant.13 0
The question, then, is whether placing a constitutional value on
the search for truth expresses a constitutional preference in violation
of First Amendment principles of belief neutrality. Does the search
for truth value run into some of the same difficulties as the religious
justifications discussed above? There are three possible answers to
this question. First, it might be argued that a search for truth ra-
tionale is not an adoption of a religious orthodoxy but is instead a
reflection of the absence of religious orthodoxy. Unlike the religious
justification, which requires the acceptance of a religious principle
(such as the priority of religious duty), the search for truth rationale
does not require the adoption of a particular dogma. At most, it
reflects a general sense of skepticism regarding the validity of any
particular claim. 3'
A second response might be that although the search for truth
justification is consistent with the theology of some religion, it is not
an approval of any specific theology. Rather, its constitutional sig-
127. See generally Ingber, Needed Clarification, supra note 56 (discussing how religion's legal
definition moved away from traditional theism and adapted to the social reality of "extreme reli-
gious diversity").
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Buddhism, for example, is one religion where the idea is probably not even a meaningful
concept. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (noting that Buddhism,
Taoism, and other religions practiced in the United States do not teach a belief in God).
131. See Smith, supra note 3, at 188 (discussing the claim that the Constitution is agnostic
toward religion); see also McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 7, at 39 (arguing that the
Constitution "must not favor one forum of religious belief over another").
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nificance is based on a commitment to freedom of choice - a mat-
ter of importance because of its relationship to liberal constitutional
theory rather than to a particular theology. Under this response, the
search for truth value does not prefer or adopt any specific religious
belief; at best, it only parallels some religious traditions.132
A third, and probably the least persuasive, response is that even if
the search for truth does represent a particular religious tradition, it
is properly included in Religion Clause theory to balance out the
other Religion Clause values which, as we have seen, represent a
competing religious model - absolutism.
To some degree, there is validity in all these responses. But there
is also validity in the initial critique. As Professor Larry Alexander
recently suggested, it is one of the dilemmas of liberal constitutional
theory that its denial of the orthodoxy of any belief claim is its own
orthodoxy, even if it is not technically a religious orthodoxy. 8 The
attack can be deflected but not fully avoided.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
The recognition of the search for truth as a fundamental value of
the Religion Clauses is more of a change in emphasis than it is an
adoption of a whole new direction. Recognizing that the search for
truth value underlies the Religion Clauses does not mean that it is
the only value; nor does providing constitutional significance to that
aspect of religion which is searching and self-doubting require rejec-
tion of the absolutist conception of religion as having constitutional
significance.
Nevertheless, the theory does hold some implications for First
Amendment jurisprudence. First, it recognizes that there is value
inherent in religious ideas similar to that found in nonreligious
ideas. It therefore rejects the argument that religion should be ex-
cluded from the political marketplace because of some presumed de-
ficiency in the nature of religious ideas themselves. In this respect,
132. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 221
(1992) (arguing that there is no constitutional difficulty in a liberal democratic understanding of
religion).
133. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. (1993) (forthcoming). See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REV. 582
(1993) (addressing arguments raised by fundamentalist Christians that liberal Western education
infringes upon their free exercise of religion by teaching that an intellectual freedom to choose
alternative lifestyles exists).
266 [Vol. 43:243
TRUTH AND RELIGION
the search for truth rationale supports the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick"" and Harris v. McRae'35
that there is no constitutional violation in prohibitions against sod-
omy or abortion, respectively, solely because those prohibitions re-
flect religious principles. If there are to be limitations on the role of
religion in the public sphere, those restrictions must be based on
something other than the substance of religious ideas.13 6
Second, by affirming the value of religious ideas in the pursuit of
truth, the search for truth value recognizes that freedom of religion
and freedom of speech are complementary parts of the same enter-
prise. This suggests that the Supreme Court has been correct in
treating Religion and Speech Clause claims similarly in both the
free speech 3 7 and free exercise contexts. 138 The pursuit of religious
truths should merit neither greater nor lesser constitutional protec-
tion than the pursuit of secular truth.
Third, a search for truth rationale would undercut the religious
claims of some groups that they have a constitutional right to be
insulated from societal forces that affect all other ideologies. Specifi-
cally, it would suggest that the Amish claim in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,' 39 or the fundamentalist claim in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Public Schools, 40 are seriously weakened if not entirely misplaced.
In both cases, the religious claim being advanced was that there was
a free exercise right not to be exposed to ideas that would purport-
edly threaten the integrity of the religious community.'" The valid-
134. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (stating that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and upholding a Georgia statute which imposed a prison
sentence for those convicted of sodomy of up to 20 years).
135. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the Hyde Amendment is constitutional because a wo-
man does not have a fundamental right to use government funds to help procure an abortion).
136. See generally William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843
(1993) (arguing that these limitations are not based on the subordination of religious ideas to
secular ideas but rather on concerns with the sociological dynamics of religion and religious
belief).
137. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a state university regulation which
prohibited the use of university premises "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching"
violated the requirement that a state regulation of speech be content-neutral).
138. Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not prevent a state from prohibiting sacramental peyote use).
139. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the Amish cannot be compelled to attend public schools
under the Free Exercise Clause).
140. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (holding that requiring
public school students to study a basic reader series chosen by school authorities did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause).
141. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-13; Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060-62.
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ity of this argument would be very much in doubt if the Religion
Clauses were premised on a search for truth rationale.
Finally, the search for truth rationale returns the soul of religion
to the Religion Clauses. There is something lacking from a Religion
Clause jurisprudence which speaks almost entirely of the value of
religion in terms of promoting the self-identity of the individual or
reinforcing the boundaries of religious communities. While the value
of religion for some lies in the answers that it offers and the comfort
it provides, for others its value lies in the questions that it asks.
CONCLUSION
The existing jurisprudence regarding the values underlying the
Religion Clauses is one-sided. It focuses only on an absolutist model
that views religion more as a source of human obligation than as a
source of human freedom. At the same time, this jurisprudence fails
to account for the relationship that exists between speech and reli-
gious freedoms, and the common questions which those freedoms
pursue. The search for truth may not be the only value underlying
the Religion Clauses, but it is one that helps make sense out of a
troubled jurisprudence, one that creates a unifying understanding of
the First Amendment, and one that provides an understanding of
the meaning of freedom of religion.
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